Simple locative sentences show a variety of pseudo-quantificational interpretations. Some locatives give the impression of universal quantification over parts of objects, others involve existential quantification, and yet others cannot be characterized by either of these quantificational terms. This behavior is explained by virtually all semantic theories of locatives. What has not been previously observed is that similar quantificational variability is also exhibited by locative sentences containing indefinites with the 'a' article. This phenomenon is especially problematic for traditional existential treatments of indefinites. We propose a solution where indefinites denote properties and are assigned locations similarly to other spatial descriptions. This Property-Eigenspace Hypothesis accounts for the correlation between the interpretations of locative indefinites and the pseudo-quantificational effects with simple entity-denoting NPs. Thereby, the proposal opens up a new empirical domain for property-based theories of indefinites, with implications for the analysis of collective descriptions, generics, negative polarity items and part-whole structure.
Introduction
Existential quantification is traditionally seen as a core element in the meaning of indefinite descriptions. However, applying a simple existential analysis to naturally occurring indefinites has often proven problematic. Indefinites in sentences involving generic, predicative, wide-scope and anaphoric effects have all been identified as serious challenges for the traditional existential account. Much work in natural language semantics since the 1970s has been driven by these challenges. This paper addresses yet another puzzle for existential theories of indefinites, which has nonetheless received little attention: the interpretation of indefinites appearing within locative prepositional phrases. Consider the following contrast discussed by Iatridou (2003 Iatridou ( , 2007 , who attributes the observation to Irene Heim (p.c.) .
(1) a. Michael is far from a gas station.
b. Michael is close to a gas station.
In the appropriate context -e.g. a car race in the desert, when Michael's car is running out of gas -sentence (1a) exhibits a universal interpretation: Michael is claimed to be far from all gas stations. By contrast, sentence (1b) has a standard existential interpretation, which only requires there to be one gas station near Michael. At first blush we may suspect that the contrast in (1) can be explained by postulating some covert negation element within the meaning of far from. This would allow us to derive the universal interpretation of sentence (1a) by assigning the existential denotation of the indefinite narrow scope below the postulated negation. However, the universal interpretation of (1a) only marks one extreme within a variety of non-existential effects with locative indefinites. Consider the following examples.
(2) a. Michael is more than/less than 5km from a gas station.
b. Michael is exactly 5km from a gas station.
While the examples in (2a) show a similar contrast to the one between (1a) and (1b), the interpretation of sentence (2b) is more complex. A prominent interpretation of this sentence requires that Michael be exactly 5km from the gas station that is nearest to him. This interpretation is not expected by the traditional existential analysis. Furthermore, it cannot be simply described by combining an existential quantifier with covert negation. Similar problems reappear in other cases of indefinites with various locative PPs. We conclude that stipulating negation as part of the meaning of certain locatives would not be a sufficiently general solution to the problem of non-existential locative indefinites.
To solve this problem, we base our analysis on the notion of kinds or properties, which is commonly used in theories of indefinites (Milsark 1974 , Carlson 1977 , Chierchia 1998 . Following these works, and adopting the theoretical setting of Partee (1987) , we assume that a indefinites are derivationally ambiguous between properties and existential quantifiers. We propose that property concepts have a spatial dimension similar to entity concepts. This allows us to treat locative indefinites as in (1) and (2) by extending standard analyses of simple locative sentences like Michael is far from/close to London, which make a statement about the distance between two entities. When a region is occupied by a complex entity like London, pseudo-quantificational effects may arise because of its part-whole structure. Thus, being far from London requires being far from all of its subparts. By contrast, being close to London only requires being close to one of its subparts. Our analysis of the contrast in (1) follows from a similar consideration about the location of properties. Sentences (1a-b) are treated as making a statement about Michael's distance from the property gas station. The location of a property is assumed to be the union of the regions associated with entities in its extension. With this assumption, sentences (1a-b) are analyzed as requiring that Michael be far from/close to the union of all gas station regions. In (1a) this analysis entails that Michael is far from all gas stations. By contrast, in (1b) it only requires that Michael be close to one gas station. Thus, we explain the contrast in (1a-b) on the basis of a simple geometrical distinction between the locatives far from and close to, which is observed independently of indefinites. The interpretation of sentences as in (2), as well as other non-existential effects with locative indefinites, are similarly explained by geometrical considerations about the meaning of spatial concepts. The pseudo-quantificational effects with locative indefinites constitute a new type of evidence for property-based treatments of indefinites that have been proposed in the last two decades (Zimmermann 1993 , Van Geenhoven 1996 , McNally 1998 , Chung & Ladusaw 2003 , Van Geenhoven & McNally 2005 . Furthermore, as we will show, the property-based analysis of locative indefinites also has broader implications for the analysis of collective descriptions, negative polarity items and part-whole structure.
Section 2 introduces standard assumptions on indefinites and locatives, together with our main hypothesis about how properties are assigned a location, or eigenspace. In section 3 we show that this analysis deals successfully with a variety of locative sentences with indefinites. Section 4 gives further support for this analysis by showing its advantages over putative accounts using covert negation. Section 5 discusses some broader implications of the proposed account as well as some open problems.
The basic proposal
The key elements of our proposal are the property denotation of a indefinites and a general semantics of locatives. We start out by reviewing two approaches to indefinites in the literature: the quantificational approach and the predicative, or property-based approach. Following Partee (1987) and others, we assume that a indefinites in English are initially property-denoting, but they may end up denoting existential quantifiers due to a derivational mechanism. We show how this approach leads to systematic ambiguity with locative indefinites. To analyze this ambiguity, we review some basic notions from previous work on locative expressions. Then we introduce our main contribution to the analysis of this puzzle: the assumption that properties can be located like ordinary entities and the principle governing this procedure, which we call the Property-Eigenspace Hypothesis.
Indefinites and properties
Since Montague (1973) , many works on natural language semantics have analyzed all NPs as denoting generalized quantifiers. Notably, Barwise & Cooper (1981) treat items like a and some as denoting existential determiners. This classic approach analyzes all occurrences of indefinites as existential or 'intersective' generalized quantifiers (Keenan & Westerståhl 2011 ). An alternative view in semantic theory has been to analyze at least some indefinites as denoting properties (Milsark 1974) . 1 Under this analysis the indefinite article a has a null contribution to the NP's denotation. Accordingly, the basic denotation of an indefinite like a gas station is assumed to be the same property denoted by the nominal part gas station. This approach directly derives a proper interpretation for sentences with predicative indefinites, e.g. this is a gas station. By contrast, with indefinites in argument positions (e.g. I see a gas station), the existential or 'specific' interpretation has to be derived by an additional semantic process. In such argument positions, Partee (1987) assumes an existential operator which applies to properties as part of the interpretation of the indefinite. Thus, in Partee's account indefinites are derivationally ambiguous between properties and existential quantifiers.
These standard procedures are also applicable to indefinites that appear within prepositional phrases. Standardly, PPs like in NYC and above NYC are analyzed as determining positions with respect to the 'landmark' object, in this case New York City. Such PPs that specify relations with respect to a landmark are referred to as locative PPs, or simply locatives. Locative PPs are distinguished from directional PPs like through NYC and from NYC that determine paths or motions relative to the landmark. When a locative like in a city contains an indefinite NP, we refer to that indefinite as a locative indefinite. Following Partee's flexible account, we embrace two derivations for sentences with locative indefinites. For instance, sentence (3) below (=(1a)) is analyzed as derivationally ambiguous between the two representations sketched in (3a-b).
(3) Michael is far from a gas station. Under the analysis in (3a), a covert existential process applies within the indefinite NP before it composes with the preposition. In analysis (3b), the preposition's denotation directly combines with the property denotation of the indefinite. We use the notation GS for the property denoted by the indefinite a gas station, and gs for the set associated with the extension of this property. Accordingly, (3a) leads to the standard analysis in (4a) below. By contrast, in (3b) the property GS remains intact and serves as the direct argument of the locative, as formalized in (4b).
(4) a. ∃x ∈ gs. far from(m, x) b. far from (m, GS) The choice between these two readings is affected by pragmatic factors, most of them beyond the scope of this paper. What is crucial for our purposes is that both strategies are attested with a indefinites in one context or another. For instance, as we will see, for sentence (3), the property-based analysis (4b) gives a correct interpretation, whereas the standard existential analysis (4a) does not. This existential analysis becomes more useful when we consider indefinites with more descriptive content such as a gas station I know. When used in locatives, such indefinites predominantly show an existential/specific interpretation. Similar interpretations are also salient with the indefinites in (5) below.
(5) Michael is far from some/a certain gas station.
In contrast with a indefinites, the indefinites in (5) are unambiguously existential or specific. We capture this interpretation by assuming that such indefinites only have the existential analysis in (4a). 2 Note that although for simplicity we adopt Partee's existential analysis, this does not do justice to specificity and other notorious phenomena in the semantics and pragmatics of indefinites. 3 To highlight this shortcoming, we informally describe existential/specific interpretations of locative indefinites as in (6) below.
(6) Michael is far from SOME ∃ gas station.
This notation can be read as having the same import as (4a), but it is also used in order to convey our conviction that the a indefinite in (3) is equivalent in one of its readings to the some indefinite in (5), while avoiding details about this existential/specific analysis. Further, NPs that are unambiguously quantificational can also appear in locative sentences, e.g. Michael is far from every gas station. Such locative sentences do not require any predication over properties, and they are analyzed by standard assumptions about quantification and scope (Barker 2014).
Locatives and eigenspaces
As we saw, sentence (3) has a prominent interpretation that is not derived by simple assumptions on existential quantification or specificity. We informally paraphrase this interpretation by writing 'Michael is far from EVERY ∀ gas station'. However, since we do not assume that this interpretation involves a universal quantifier over entities, we refer to it as pseudo-universal. Analysis (4b) models the pseudo-universal interpretation by letting the locative relation apply to the entity denotation of the name Michael and the property denotation of the indefinite a gas station. Our challenge is to explain how properties stand in such locative relations to entities, examine the interpretations that this option derives and check whether they conform with linguistic intuitions. We start out by reviewing some standard assumptions on the semantics of locative PPs (Wunderlich 1991 , J. Zwarts & Winter 2000 . Consider first the simple locative sentence (7) below.
(7) Michael is far from London.
At the compositional level, sentence (7) expresses a binary relation between entities. This is formalized below.
(8) far from (m, l) In this analysis, the entity l is the landmark and the entity m is the located object. More explicitly, the analysis in (8) is expanded to the following spatial analysis.
(9) FAR FROM(LOC(m), LOC(l)) In (9), the relation FAR FROM is the two-place locative predicate underlying the meaning of the binary relation far from. The relation FAR FROM holds in (9) between two spatial objects: the locations LOC(m) and LOC(l) of the entities m and l. Following Wunderlich (1991) , we refer to the location of an entity as the entity's eigenspace. 4 As we formally elaborate below, we use points and regions (=sets of points) as the spatial semantic objects that model eigenspaces. In locative sentences, we assume that the eigenspace of the located object is a point, whereas the landmark has a region as its eigenspace. When the eigenspace of the entity for Michael is the point m, and the eigenspace of London is the region L, we write:
(10) LOC(m) = m; LOC(l) = L Summing up, we treat the logical form (8) as expressing a spatial relation FAR FROM between the point m and the region L. In formula:
This analysis immediately expects a pseudo-universal interpretation of sentence (7). By basic properties of the locative relation FAR FROM, which we spell out formally in the next section, it follows that when a point m is far from a region L, it is far from every point in L. Thus, analysis (11) expects that sentence (7) is interpreted similarly to the statement 'Michael is far from EVERY ∀ part of London'. From a geometrical point of view this connection between spatial relations and part-whole structure is unsurprising (Iris et al. 1988 , Casati & Varzi 1999 , Johansson 2004 . However, when it is combined with the property analysis of indefinites, it provides a straightforward account of their puzzling behavior in locative sentences.
Locative indefinites: the Property-Eigenspace Hypothesis
Our account of the pseudo-universal interpretation of (3) follows from the analysis in (4b), where the spatial relation holds between an entity and a property. To deal with this situation, we let any spatial property have an eigenspace of its own, similar to spatial entities. Thus, when locating the entity m and the property GS we get the following spatial-level analysis of (4b).
(12) FAR FROM(LOC(m), LOC(GS)) Here the spatial relation FAR FROM holds between Michael's eigenspace and the eigenspace for the property GS. The main new element of our proposal is in the way properties are located. We define the eigenspace of properties on the basis of the eigenspaces of entities in their extension. Specifically, we adopt the following hypothesis.
(13) Property-Eigenspace Hypothesis (PEH): A property's eigenspace is the union of eigenspaces for entities in its extension.
In our analysis (12) of sentence (3), the PEH requires that the eigenspace LOC(GS) of the property GS be the union of eigenspaces for entities in the set gs, the extension of the property. In formula:
Summing up, we get the following property-based analysis of sentence (3):
In words, (15) states that the point m for Michael's location is far from the region composed of all gas station regions. As we show in detail in section 3, this statement correctly captures the pseudo-universal interpretation of the locative indefinite in (3). More generally, our analysis derives non-existential interpretations of locative indefinites by using the same principles that account for locative sentences with referential NPs. Because of this reduction, the PEH expects the following generalization.
(16) PEH Generalization: The pseudo-quantificational behavior of locative indefinites correlates with the pseudo-quantificational behavior of locative referential NPs.
This generalization makes a connection between the interpretation of locative indefinites, and the geometrical aspects of locative meanings as attested with pseudo-quantificational interpretations of locative referential NPs. It should be kept in mind that we assume that, in addition to their property-based analysis, all locative indefinites also have standard existential/specific readings. The correlation expected in (16) only concerns pseudo-quantificational interpretations, and not this standard reading. For instance, as we have seen, the pseudouniversal interpretation of the indefinite a gas station in sentence (3) correlates with a pseudo-universal interpretation of the proper name London in (7). According to the PEH generalization, this type of correlation should hold for all pseudo-quantificational interpretations of locative indefinites. Specifically, for any non-existential interpretation of locative indefinites, the PEH generalization expects to find a parallel effect with locative referential NPs, and vice versa. Section 3 shows empirical support for this expectation.
Evidence for the property-eigenspace hypothesis
This section lays out the main arguments for our property-based approach and the PEH. We go over different types of locative relations, the non-existential effects they lead to with indefinites, and the way these effects are accounted for in our proposal. This supports the PEH generalization, hence the PEH itself and more generally the property-based account of a indefinites.
A technical preliminary: topological spaces
In section 2 and throughout this paper, we treat eigenspaces of landmarks (e.g. London in (7)) as regions. Eigenspaces of located objects (e.g. Michael in (7)) are unrealistically modeled as points. Accordingly, locative relations are treated as relations between points and regions. 5 
Topological locatives
Topological locative concepts are those geometrical concepts that can be defined by only referring to a topological space (i.e. points and regions), without invoking further geometrical concepts like distances or directions. The basic topological concepts we treat are INSIDE and OUTSIDE. Some English locatives that express these concepts are given below.
(17) Topological locatives INSIDE: in, inside (of), within OUTSIDE: out of, outside (of), without 5 A more general treatment would model locatives as binary relations between regions. However, that would introduce complications that are unnecessary for our purposes here. See J. Zwarts & Winter (2000) for an analysis where all eigenspaces are uniformly treated as regions. 6 I.e. for any subset A of T , the union ∪A is in T , and if A has finitely many members then the intersection ∩A is also in T (see Definition 1).
Concentrating on the topological usage of the prepositions in (17), consider for instance the antonyms inside and outside in the following simple sentences.
(18) a. The visitor is inside the building.
b. The visitor is outside the building.
Sentence (18a) has a pseudo-existential interpretation, paraphrased in (19a) below, whereas (18b) has the pseudo-universal interpretation, as in (19b).
(19) a. The visitor is inside SOME ∃ part of the building. b. The visitor is outside EVERY ∀ part of the building.
In correspondence with this pseudo-quantificational alternation in (18) we also observe an existential/universal contrast with indefinites appearing with INSIDE and OUTSIDE locatives. Consider for instance the following examples collected from the internet.
(20) a. Every vehicle or trailer which is parked outside of a garage shall display license plates with current registration tabs. b. I personally find the planets that formed outside of a star system more fascinating than ejecta. c. One-third of the funded proposals shall serve schools within a Metropolitan County, and at least one-third shall serve schools outside of a Metropolitan County.
In (20a), the vehicles and trailers quantified over are those that are outside of any garage. Similarly, in (20b), the planets referred to are those that are formed outside of any star system. In other words, the indefinites within the outside of locatives of (20a) and (20b) are interpreted universally. In sentence (20c), the interpretation of the indefinite with the preposition outside of is again universal. However, the indefinite with the preposition within is existential. Thus, the schools that are served include those that are within some metropolitan county and those that are outside of all the relevant metropolitan counties. Although we assume a topological space as the basis for our spatial model, for the topological concepts INSIDE and OUTSIDE we do not exploit the full power of this ontology. We define these locative relations by merely appealing to set-membership between points and regions. Below we define these two concepts.
(21) For all points x and regions A:
This immediately leads to the following observations.
In words: a point x is inside a region A iff x is inside some singleton sub-region {y} of A;
x is outside A iff x is outside every such singleton.
Having observed these facts, we cannot be surprised by the equivalences between the locative sentences (18a-b) and the quantificational statements in (19a-b) . For instance, consider the equivalence (18b)⇔(19b). When sentence (18b) holds, by (22b) we conclude that any part of the building must consist of points that are disjoint from the eigenspace of the visitor, hence the visitor is outside every such part, i.e. (19b) holds. Conversely, when (19b) holds, observation (22b) means that the visitor's eigenspace is different than any point within any part of the building. Therefore, the visitor's eigenspace is outside the building, as (18b) states. The equivalence (18a)⇔(19a) is similarly accounted for by observation (22a). In more general terms, this analysis explains why OUTSIDE locatives support pseudo-universal interpretations with respect to the part-whole structure of the landmark, while INSIDE locatives support pseudo-existential interpretations. For more on the essential relation between part-whole structure and spatial expressions, see Cruse (1979) , Herskovits (1986) , Winston et al. (1987) , Iris et al. (1988 ), Moltmann (1997 , Casati & Varzi (1999) and Johansson (2004) .
Let us now get back to locative indefinites. In (20) we demonstrated that indefinites in topological PPs may show a similar pattern to locative referential NPs: pseudo-existential interpretations with INSIDE locatives and pseudo-universal interpretations with OUTSIDE locatives. The PEH derives such pseudo-quantificational effects with indefinites as stemming from the same considerations that we used to account for sentences (18a-b). Consider the following simplified versions of the sentences in (20c).
(23) a. The school is within a metropolitan county.
b. The school is outside of a metropolitan county.
First, because we use Partee's assumption on the flexibility of a indefinites, both sentences in (23) are expected to have an existential reading. However, in addition to this standard analysis, we also expect a property-based interpretation, derived by the PEH. To see what this interpretation amounts to, let us use MC for the property denotation of metropolitan county, where mc is the set of entities in its extension. Recall that the PEH takes the eigenspace of the property MC to be the union of eigenspaces of entities in mc. This means that the eigenspace LOC(MC) is treated as the union ∪A, where A is the collection of eigenspaces {LOC(x) ∶ x ∈ mc}. Consider now a direct result from our observation in (22). For every collection of regions A, for every point x we have:
In words: a point x is inside the union of the regions in A iff x is inside some region A in A;
x is outside this union iff x is outside every region in A. This observation explains the behavior of the locative indefinites in (23) as following from the PEH. To see this more concretely, consider our PEH-based analyses of sentences (23a-b), which are given in (25a-b) below with the point s as the school's location.
The analysis in (25a) means that the only pseudo-quantificational effects that the PEH expects for a indefinites with INSIDE locatives are existential. Thus, in this case the propertybased analysis that we introduce converges with the standard quantificational analysis. By contrast, the analysis in (25b) means that the PEH expects OUTSIDE locatives to give rise to pseudo-universal effects with a indefinites, in addition to their standard existential reading. This distinction between INSIDE indefinites and OUTSIDE indefinites accounts for the contrast in (20c) above.
Distal locatives and 'outside' presuppositions
Locatives like far from and close to introduce requirements on the distance between eigenspaces. English distal locatives often involve a predicate over distances (far, close, 20km ) and a directional preposition (from, to). We distinguish between distal locatives according to the monotonicity of their distance predicate. Intuitively, upward/downward monotonicity of the distance predicate is characterized as its closure under lengthening/shortening of distances within it. For instance, we say that the adjective far is an upwardmonotone distance predicate, because if a distance is considered far, then any bigger distance is considered far as well. Accordingly, we classify the locative far from as an upwardmonotone distal locative (DIST M↑ ). Analogously, the locative close to is classified as downward monotone (DIST M↓ ) because of the downward-monotonicity of the predicate close. Now consider the distance predicate exactly 20km. A distance of exactly 20km is within this predicate, but if we lengthen or shorten such a distance, we may get out of the predicate's extension. Because of that, we classify the distal expression exactly 20km from as a non-monotone locative (DIST M¬ ). Some more examples for the three types of distal locatives are given below.
(26) Distal locatives DIST M↑ : far from, away from, more than/at least 20km (away) from DIST M↓ : close to, near (to), less than/at most 20km (away) from DIST M¬ : exactly 20km (away) from, between 20km and 30km (away) from
The monotonicity properties of distal locatives affect pseudo-quantificational effects in simple locative sentences. Let us first demonstrate that with the monotone distal locatives at least/most 20km from. Consider the intuitive equivalences between sentences (27a-b) below and the respective sentences in (28a-b).
(27) a. Michael is at least 20km from London. b. Michael is at most 20km from London.
(28) a. Michael is at least 20km from EVERY ∀ part of London. b. Michael is at most 20km from SOME ∃ part of London.
The interpretation of (27a) is pseudo-universal similarly to the behavior of the DIST M↑ locative far from (cf. (7)). Sentence (27b) is only interpreted as pseudo-existential, similarly to the behavior of the parallel sentence with the DIST M↓ locative close to. When monotone distal locatives combine with indefinites, we observe pseudo-quantificational variability similar to (27) . Consider for instance the intuitive interpretations of sentences (29a-b) as paraphrased in (30a-b), respectively.
(29) a. Michael is at least 20km from a gas station. b. Michael is at most 20km from a gas station.
(30) a. Michael is at least 20km from EVERY ∀ gas station. b. Michael is at most 20km from SOME ∃ gas station.
In (29a) the DIST M↑ locative leads to a pseudo-universal interpretation, parallel to the pseudouniversal interpretation of (27a) above. This is the same parallelism we observed with the DIST M↑ locative far from in (3) and (7). In (29b) the DIST M↓ locative supports a (pseudo) existential interpretation parallel to the interpretation of (27b) above. These parallelisms between (29) and (27) show further support for our PEH generalization in (16). To see how the PEH accounts for these data, let us look further into the formal semantics of distal locatives. We endow the spatial ontology with a metric function d that models distances between points as real numbers. Formally, a metric function over a set M is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (metric function). Let M be a non-empty set, and let d be a function from the cartesian product M × M to non-negative real numbers in R. The function d is called a metric function if it satisfies the following requirements for all elements x, y ∈ M :
The set M together with the metric d are called a metric space. Any metric space can be naturally defined as a topological space (Kelley 1955, p.119) . We let a metric space M with its natural topology be the spatial ontology for distal locatives. Definition 3 below naturally extends the metric function d to measure distances between points and closed regions. 7
Definition 3 (distance). For every non-empty closed region A ⊆ M and a point x ∈ M not in A, the distance between x and A is defined by:
In words: d(x, A) is the minimal distance between x and points in A. Here and henceforth, we assume for simplicity that all eigenspace regions are closed. Further, Definition 3 ignores cases where the point x is in the region A. The reason for this will be clarified as we go along.
A distal locative concept is defined on the basis of its distance predicate, or the corresponding set of distances. Suppose that R is a set of non-negative real numbers that correspond to distances in a metric space. On the basis of the set R, a distal relation DIST R is defined as follows.
(31) For any region A and point x ∈ A:
In words: for any set R of non-negative real numbers, the relation DIST R holds between a point x and a region A if the distance between x and A is a number in R.
Specific distal locatives are directly derived by the definition in (31) with various distance predicates determining the set R. Consider the locative far from. We assume that the distal predicate far contributes as the set R a semi-open interval (r, ∞), of all the real numbers bigger than some contextually given r. By using this interval, (31) derives a definition for the locative relation FAR FROM. Formally, for every region A and point x ∈ A we have:
In words: a point x is considered far from a region A iff the distance between x and A is bigger than r. Note that the interval (r, ∞) corresponding to the predicate far is upwardmonotone in the following sense: for every real number r ′ in (r, ∞), any number bigger than r ′ is in (r, ∞) as well. As we will see below, central semantic properties of the locative far from follow directly from this upward-monotonicity of the interval (r, ∞).
Other distal concepts are similarly derived from (31), by specifying the real numbers in the set R. Thus, semantic properties of distal locatives are systematically affected by monotonicity properties of R. For the DIST M↑ locative at least 20km from we assume that the set R is the interval [20, ∞) of real numbers that model the distances of 20km and more. Accordingly we denote:
In words: the point x is at least 20km from the region A iff the distance between them is greater or equal than 20. Note that the interval [20, ∞) in (33) is again upward-monotone.
When the set R of real numbers is upward-monotone as in (32) and (33), we get the following fact, similar to fact (24b) about OUTSIDE locatives.
(34) Let R be an upward-monotone set of distances. For any collection of regions A and a point x ∈ ∪A, we have:
In words: when R is upward-monotone, the distance between a point x and the union of regions in A is in R iff the distance between x and every region A in A is in R. Specifically in our examples for DIST M↑ locatives, we get:
These equivalences immediately account for the pseudo-universal interpretations of sentences with DIST M↑ locatives. First, sentence (7) ('Michael is far from London') is analyzed as equivalent to Michael is far from EVERY ∀ part of London, and similarly for the equivalence (27a)⇔(28a) with the predicate at least 20km. A similar analysis is used for the pseudoquantificational interpretation of a indefinites with these locatives. Consider for instance the PEH-based analysis below of sentence (29a) (='Michael is at least 20km from a gas station'), and the equivalence it gives rise to. 8 (36) AT LEAST 20KM FROM(m, LOC(GS)) ▹ analysis of (29a)
▹ by (35b) This is the pseudo-universal interpretation of (29a), typical of many DIST M↑ indefinites.
We would now like to consider the formal treatment of DIST M↓ locatives like close to. However, before moving on there is a basic empirical question about such locatives that we need to address: can we indeed classify their pseudo-quantificational behavior as existential? Consider for instance sentence (37a) below, and the attempt to paraphrase it in (37b).
(37) a. Michael is close to London.
b. Michael is close to some part of London.
There is little doubt that sentence (37a) entails (37b). However, whether there is also an entailment in the other direction is less evident. Suppose that Michael is in London. In such a case there are surely one or more parts of London that Michael is close to, hence sentence (37b) is true and acceptable, even if somewhat uninformative. By contrast, when we know that Michael is in London it would be very odd to assert sentence (37a). We attribute this oddity of (37a) not to mere falsity of the assertion, but to a presupposition failure. In general terms, we assume that any sentence of the form A is close to B presupposes that A is outside B, but does not assert it. As evidence for this claim consider the following examples, based on the presupposition tests from Von Fintel (2004) .
(38) a. A: Mary lives close to her parents' home. B: Hey, wait a minute. I had no idea that she has left their home. b. I hope that Mary lives close to her parents' place. c. If Mary is living close to her parents, she has a chance of having her laundry done fairly regularly.
Using Von Fintel's tests, we take the examples in (38) as support for our assumption about the outside presupposition of close to. In (38a), B's reaction indicates that A's utterance presupposes that Mary lives out of her parents' home, rather than asserting this claim. Further, in (38b) the utterance does not express a hope that Mary doesn't live with her parents, but rather presupposes it as a fact. Lastly, in (38c) the statement that Mary does not live with her parents gets projected out of the conditional's antecedent, which indicates that this claim is a presupposition of the antecedent rather than part of the assertion. Getting back to sentences (37a-b), we have concluded that the two sentences are not conversationally equivalent: sentence (37a) presupposes that Michael is outside London whereas (37b) does not. (37b) only presupposes that Michael is outside some or other part of London (incidentally, this is true in all situations, even when Michael is in London). We conclude that when Michael is outside London, both sentences in (37) can be safely asserted, since all the relevant presuppositions are met. Now, in such cases there is no truth-conditional difference between the two sentences: if Michael is outside London then he is close to London if and only if he is close to some part of the city. This is what Von Fintel (1999) calls Strawson-entailments: cases where an entailment holds between sentences provided that all their presuppositions are satisfied. Accordingly, we say that sentences (37a) and (37b) are Strawson-equivalent.
Against this background consider now the denotations of the locatives close to and at most 20km from that are derived from definition (31) for the sets of distances [0, r) and [0, 20] respectively. For any region A and point x ∈ A, we have:
In words: the relation CLOSE TO holds between the region A and a point x outside A if the distance between x and A is smaller than some specified 'small' distance r; AT MOST 20KM FROM holds if the distance between x and A is at most 20km. Note that the intervals [0, r) and [0, 20] are both downward-monotone within the set of non-negative reals. Note further that since they are based on definition (31), definitions (39) and (40) are only specified for cases in which the point x is not in A, i.e. the outside presupposition of the corresponding sentence holds. Now we observe, in contrast to (34), that for any set R of real numbers that is downwardmonotone as in (39) and (40), the following fact holds similar to fact (24b) about INSIDE locatives.
(41) Let R be an downward-monotone set of distances. For any collection of regions A and a point x ∈ ∪A, we have:
In words: when R is downward-monotone, the distance between the union of regions in A and a point x outside this union is in R iff the distance between x and some region A in A is in R (cf. (22a)). Specifically in our examples of DIST M↓ locatives, we get:
These facts explain why sentences like (37a) and (37b) are judged to be equivalent under the presupposition of (37a) that Michael is outside London. Moving back to indefinites, we see that given the PEH, facts (42a) and (42b) also explain the pseudo-existential interpretation of locative indefinites with DIST M↓ locatives. For instance, let us reconsider sentence (29b), restated in (43a) below, and its pseudo-existential interpretation in (43b).
(43) a. Michael is at most 20km from a gas station.
b. Michael is at most 20km from SOME ∃ gas station.
Our property-based treatment of sentence (43a) leads to the following analysis of this sentence.
(44) Asserted:
Whenever the presupposition in (44) holds, the definition of OUTSIDE in (21) means that the point m is not in the gas station eigenspace LOC(GS), or, in terms of the PEH:
Accordingly, we get:
▹ by (42b) The last equivalence follows from the general property (41) of DIST M↓ locatives, whose condition x ∈ ∪A holds here thanks to the outside presupposition in (45). So far we have only considered monotone distal locatives and seen how they support pseudo-existential and pseudo-universal interpretations. Let us now move on to cases where the distance predicate within a distal locative is non-monotone. In such cases the interpretations that emerge cannot simply be described as 'existential' or 'universal'. Consider first sentence (47) below.
(47) Michael is (exactly) 20km from London.
The interpretation of (47) is non-existential because in a situation where some part of London is 20km from Michael, the sentence may still be false if there is another part of London at a shorter distance. The interpretation of (47) is also non-universal, since the sentence may easily be true when many parts of London are at a distance of more than 20km from Michael. The actual interpretation of sentence (47) is paraphrased below.
(48) The part of London that is closest to Michael is 20km away from him.
On the background of the discussion above, this interpretation of (47) is hardly surprising. We associate the non-monotone distance predicate exactly 20km with the singleton set {20}. The corresponding distal locative is accordingly defined below.
According to this analysis, sentence (47) makes the distal assertion d(m, L) = 20, which requires that the closest point in L is 20km away from m, as intuitively required. This requirement is not existential because it cannot be satisfied if there are points in L whose distance from m is shorter than 20km. It is not universal because it may be satisfied when there are points in L whose distance from m is bigger than 20km.
A similar behavior is observed with locative indefinites. Consider the following sentence.
(50) Michael is (exactly) 20km from a gas station.
In our "desert context", where the question under discussion is how likely it is that Michael can continue the race, sentence (50) has an interpretation that is paraphrased as follows.
(51) The gas station that is closest to Michael is 20km away from him.
With the considerations above, we cannot be surprised that this interpretation of sentence (50) cannot be expressed as either existential or universal. To see that statement (51) is not simple existential quantification over gas stations, suppose that one gas station is exactly 20km from Michael but there is also another gas station that is nearer to Michael's location, say at a distance of 10km. In the given context this situation makes the prominent interpretation of sentence (50) false, although the existential requirement ('Michael is 20km from SOME ∃ gas station') is satisfied. Further, interpretation (51) is not universal, since it allows many gas stations to be at larger distances than 20km.
We conclude that sentence (50) has a prominent non-existential interpretation, which is furthermore non-universal. Our PEH-based analysis correctly derives this interpretation, as formalized below.
(52) 20KM FROM(m, LOC(GS)) By definition (49) of the distal relation 20KM FROM, we get the following analysis.
(53) d(m, LOC(GS)) = 20
In words: the distance between Michael's location and the location of the property GS is exactly 20km. This means that the closest point in the region LOC(GS) is 20km from the point m. Thus, there must be some gas station 20km from Michael, and every other gas station is at a distance that is greater or equal to 20km. This is the interpretation attested for sentence (50) in the given context.
We may, if we like, restate the same interpretation of sentence (50) in terms of quantification over entities, as in the following sentence.
(54) Michael is at most 20km from SOME ∃ gas station and at least 20km from EVERY ∀ gas station.
The paraphrase (54) is equivalent to (51). However, this way of paraphrasing the interpretation of sentence (50) may create the false impression that some or other quantification over entities must always be part of the meaning of locative indefinites. The paraphrase (54) relies on the possibility to present the non-monotone distal predicate 20km as a boolean combination of the monotone distal predicates at least 20km and at most 20km. As in the domain of generalized quantifiers (Thijsse 1983) , there are also non-monotone numeric predicates that cannot be expressed in this way. Consider for instance the non-monotone distance predicate an even number of meters. As Thijsse points out, such numeric expressions cannot be described as finite boolean combinations of monotone expressions. Accordingly, we should not expect any finite pseudo-quantificational paraphrase for sentences with DIST M¬ locatives like an even number of meters from. Of course this is a rather artificial example, but it highlights a general lesson: there is no guarantee that sentences with locative indefinites have interpretations that can be paraphrased by using quantification over entities. In the next section we see further evidence for this claim.
Projective locatives
Projective locatives describe positions relative to a specific direction from a landmark. Some examples for this type of locatives are given below.
(55) Projective locatives: above, behind, north of, (to the) left of Each of the projective locatives in (55) pertains to a different direction from the landmark. The determination of this direction in actual utterances is sensitive to various contextual factors like gravitation or intrinsic properties of the landmark (Herskovits 1986 ). For instance, the prepositional phrase above John's head describes locations relative to an upward direction from John's head. What is considered 'upwards' may be relative to the earth or to John's posture. For instance, when John lies supine, the locative above John's head may refer to two different directions. Contextual information may prime any of these two directions.
The connection between projective locatives and the part-whole structure of landmarks is often quite complex. This defies any attempt to describe their meanings by using pseudoquantificational paraphrases as we have so far done in our discussion of topological and distal locatives. Consider for instance the following two sentences in the context of Figure  1a .
(56) a. The dot is to the left of the line.
b. The dot is to the right of the line.
Sentence (56a) is intuitively true in Figure 1a , whereas (56b) is false. Following J. Zwarts & Winter (2000) (henceforth Z&W), we capture such effects by appealing to the shortest vector from the landmark to the located object. In Figure 1b this is the vector v from the line to the dot. As illustrated, v has a non-zero 'left of' component c L (v). By contrast, v has zero component in the 'right of' direction. 9 Accordingly, we adopt the following definition of the projective concept LEFT OF.
(57) For any region A and point x ∈ A:
LEFT OF(x, A) ⇔ the shortest vector from A to x has a non-zero 'left of' component
Definition (57), together with the analogous definition for the locative RIGHT OF, accounts for the contrast between sentences (56a) and (56b) in the context of Figure 1 . Note that it would be hard to describe such contrasts in terms of pseudo-quantification over parts of the line. The reason is that in Figure 1 , the dot is to the left of some parts of the line, and to the right of other parts of it. Thus, existential quantification over parts of the line would make (56b) incorrectly true, and universal quantification over parts of the line would make (56a) incorrectly false. The interpretation of sentences like (56a-b) inherently involves the shape of the objects and their spatial configuration. In general it is hard, if not impossible, to describe meanings of locatives correctly in terms of quantification over parts without taking into account the more 'holistic' aspects of spatial concepts. For this reason, the behavior of projective concepts as in (56) and Figure 1a is a good test for our analysis of indefinites. 9 For any non-zero vectors v and w in a vector space V , v's component along w is the (provably unique) vector cw(v) that satisfies v = cw(v) + u, where '+' is vector addition and u is the (provably unique) projection of the vector v on the set w of vectors orthogonal to w (see e.g. Lang 1977, 134) . Interpreted in these terms, Figure 1b demonstrates that v has a non-zero component along any non-zero vector in the 'left' direction.
Let us consider the locative indefinites in the following sentences, visà vis the facts described above.
(58) a. The dot is to the left of a circle.
b. The dot is to the right of a circle.
In the context of Figure 2a , both (58a) and (58b) may be interpreted as true. This fact is consistent with the existential interpretation of these sentences: in Figure 2a the dot is to the left of one circle and to the right of another circle. This is accounted for in our proposal by the standard existential analysis, which is assumed as an option for all occurrences of indefinites (section 2). What is more surprising is that in the context of Figure 2a there is a clear contrast between the two sentences in (58). While sentence (58a) is univocally true in Figure 2a , sentence (58b) may easily be interpreted as false. Grimm et al. (2014) report experimental results that consistently show this effect with indefinites in projective locatives. In relation to Dutch examples similar to (58), Grimm et al. report that out of 21 Dutch speaking participants, 15 accepted a sentence similar to (58a) as true in a situation like Figure 2a . By contrast, only 5 of the 21 participants accepted a sentence similar to (58b) as true in this situation. This indicates that in the context of Figure 2a , a non-existential strategy is more prominent in (58b) than the existential strategy. The PEH offers a direct explanation of this non-existential strategy. According to the PEH-based analysis, sentence (58a) has a reading paraphrased as in (59a), whereas (58b) has the reading in (59b).
(59) a. The dot is to the left of the area occupied by the circles.
b. The dot is to the right of the area occupied by the circles.
The PEH-based paraphrase (59a) of (58a) is true in Figure 2a according to the same principles that make sentence (56a) true in Figure 1 . Analogously, the PEH-based paraphrase (59b) of (58b) is false in Figure 2a similarly to (56b) in Figure 1 . More formally, consider our PEH-based analysis of (58a) in (60) below. The notation CIRC and circ is for the property denotation of the noun circle and for its set extension, respectively. The notation d is for the eigenspace of the dot.
(60) LEFT OF(d, LOC(CIRC)) ▹ property-based analysis of (58a) ⇔ the shortest vector from LOC(CIRC) to d has a non-zero 'left of' component ▹ by definition (57) ⇔ the shortest vector from ∪{LOC(x) ∶ x ∈ circ} to d has a non-zero 'left of' component ▹ by PEH ⇔ the shortest vector to d from the circle in circ that is closest to d has a non-zero 'left of' component
In Figure 2a we have circ = {c 1 , c 2 }, and the closest circle to d is c 1 . Therefore, the shortest vector from the eigenspace of the indefinite a circle to d is the vector v from c 1 to d. As illustrated in Figure 2b , this vector has a non-zero left component c L (v). Hence the PEH-based analysis of sentence (58a) is true in Figure 2a . By contrast, the PEH analyzes sentence (58b) as false, since v has a zero right component. According to the assumed derivational ambiguity of indefinites, both sentences also have a true reading in Figure 2a .
This explains why some speakers accept (58a) and reject (58b) in Figure 2a , while other speakers accept both sentences. For the first group of speakers, the PEH-based strategy is apparently more salient than the existential strategy, hence they accept (58a) but reject (58b) with Figure 2a . For the second group the existential strategy is more salient, hence they accept both sentences with this figure. For the situation in Figure 2a , all speakers accepted sentence (58a) as true, as the PEH and the existential strategy converge. We conclude that the PEH, combined with our assumption about the derivational ambiguity of locative indefinites, correctly describes the contrast we found between sentences (58a) and (58b) in the context of Figure 2a .
Modified locatives
Locative prepositions may appear together with a preceding modificational element within the PP. A modifier of a locative may be a distal predicate as in 10km outside or an adverb as in diagonally above. We focus on three types of modified locatives as exemplified in (61) We will show further support for the PEH generalization (16) by observing that modified PPs also show close parallelisms between the interpretation of locative indefinites and the interpretation of locative referential NPs. We concentrate on three test cases of PP modification, one for each of the three classes in (61). For each test case we show a simple strategy for interpreting modified PPs with referential NPs. Then we show that the same strategy accounts for non-existential effects with locative indefinites.
Test case 1: distal modification of topological outside
Consider the following example.
(62) The hotel is far outside the city center.
In (62) the preposition outside is used topologically, and the PP is modified by the distal predicate far. We can restate such sentences using a conjunction of a topological statement and a distal statement, as in the following paraphrase. 10 10 As we see below, this conjunctive strategy is not general, and is only made possible by the topological use of outside in (62). However, there is a projective use for outside: in the stall is diagonally outside the restaurant, the entrance of the restaurant is seen as projecting a direction similar to in front of. As we see below, in such cases PP modification cannot be treated by using conjunction. The conjunctive strategy also fails with modification of topological INSIDE locatives, as in the station is located 50 miles within the park, which means that the station is 50 miles from the border of the park, not from the park itself. Also for such cases, we need to use a more general strategy for modifying projective PPs, as discussed below.
(63) The hotel is outside the city center and far from the city center.
Because of the equivalence between (62) and (63), the meaning of the modified PP can be described by using a conjunction between the distal locative and the topological locative. Formally, we define the modified locative concept FAR OUTSIDE as follows.
This simple analysis is satisfactory for sentence (62). In such cases the topological concept OUTSIDE adds little semantic content to the purely distal statement the hotel is far from the city center. 11 Thus, the analysis in (64) together with our account of distal and topological locatives explains why the interpretation of (62) is pseudo-universal, as paraphrased below.
(65) The hotel is far outside EVERY ∀ part of the city center.
Also indefinites within modified OUTSIDE locatives may give rise to non-existential effects. Consider for instance the following examples from the internet.
(66) a. This scene shows Roamer ships encountering a huge, derelict alien city in space, far outside of a star system. b. The participants were primarily Caucasian and lived at least 25 miles outside of a town of 12,500 or more people.
Sentence (66a), with the upward-monotone distal modifier far, shows a pseudo-universal effect, which can be paraphrased by "far outside every star system". Similarly, the upwardmonotone modifier at least 25 miles in (66b) also gives rise to a pseudo-universal effect: the participants are claimed to live at a distance of at least 25 miles from every big town. The PEH correctly treats such non-existential indefinites by using the conjunctive assumption in (64), and the analysis of indefinites within topological and distal locatives in sections 3.2 and 3.3 above. In a similar way, the PEH augmented by the conjunctive analysis account of PP modification, analyzes non-existential effects with downward-monotone modifiers and topological outside, as in the following example from the internet.
(67) There's a large selection of campus universities -many built in the 1960s -usually located a few miles outside of a town or city.
Sentence (68a) below simplifies (67), and can be paraphrased as in (68b).
(68) a. The campus is located a few miles outside of a city. b. The campus is located outside of EVERY ∀ city, and a few miles from SOME ∃ city.
This mixture of a pseudo-universal and a pseudo-existential effect is directly explained by the PEH and the analysis of the modified PP by using a conjunction of the OUTSIDE locative and the DIST M↓ locative a few miles from. The OUTSIDE locative contributes the pseudouniversal effect, whereas the DIST M↓ locative makes a pseudo-existential contribution. 
Test case 2: adverbial modifiers with projective locatives
The conjunctive analysis is not a general solution to the problem of modified locatives. Matters become more complex when the modified locative is projective. Consider sentences (69a-b) below, based on Z&W's discussion of projective locatives with adverbial modifiers.
(69) a. The dot is straight above the circle.
b. The dot is diagonally above the circle.
The locatives STRAIGHT ABOVE and DIAGONALLY ABOVE in (69) cannot simply be defined based on intersection with the denotation of the modifiers straight and diagonally. The reason is that it is hard to conceive of these two adverbials as binary relations on locations. In (69) the modifiers do not simply describe 'straight' or 'diagonal' positions or directions from the circle. What counts as 'straight' or 'diagonal' can only be determined relative to a given direction from the landmark. In (69) the relevant direction ('upward') is determined by the preposition above. As Z&W note, this kind of phenomenon poses a challenge for any straightforward intersective analysis of the modification in (69). Z&W account for modified PPs as in (69) using their notion of shortest vectors. Consider for instance the following sentence in the situation of Figure 3a .
(70) The bird is diagonally above the house.
Sentence (70) is true in Figure 3a but false (or highly weird) in Figure 3b . Z&W's analysis uses the shortest vector between the bird and the house to account for this contrast. In Figure  3a the shortest vector can truthfully be characterized as 'diagonal with respect to the above direction'. By contrast, in Figure 3b the shortest vector from the house to the bird is not diagonal but straight with respect to the above direction from the house. Summarizing, and skipping some formal details, we restate Z&W's account of sentence (70) by specifying the locative DIAGONALLY ABOVE as follows.
(71) DIAGONALLY ABOVE(x, A) ⇔ the shortest vector from A to x is diagonal with respect to the above direction This analysis highlights the fact that the interpretation of sentence (70) cannot be described as pseudo-existential. For the bird to be diagonally above the house, it is not enough for it to be diagonally above some part of the house. If that were the case, sentence (70) should have been equally acceptable in Figures 3a and 3b . Rather, for the bird to be diagonally above the house it has to be diagonally above the closest part of the house, as required by Z&W's account.
Consider now the following locative indefinite sentence in the context of Figure 4a .
(72) The bird is diagonally above a cloud.
In Figure 4a , sentence (72) is intuitively true. By contrast, in Figure 4b , the sentence is true under its existential interpretation, but intuitively it also has a non-existential interpretation under which it is false. To see this in a more natural context, consider the following example, which describes two cases of aerial inflammations. 12 (73) The first case arises when the inflammation is straight above a thick cloud, the second when it is obliquely above a thick cloud.
Sentence (73) refers to two distinct cases of inflammation. Thus, in the second case, where the inflammation is obliquely above some thick cloud, we expect the first case not to hold, i.e. we expect the inflammation not to be located straight above any other thick cloud. This shows a non-existential effect in the interpretation of the italicized PP in (73): the locative indefinite refers to the position of the inflammation relative to the closest cloud below it. This is the same 'non-existential' behavior we observed in sentence (70), where the part of the house that is relevant for (70)'s truth in Figure 3a is the part that is closest to the bird. When we adopt Z&W's shortest vector account we can readily use the PEH to account for non-existential effects with indefinites as in (72) and (73). Specifically, for (72) we get the following analysis.
(74) DIAGONALLY ABOVE(b, LOC(CLOUD)) ▹ property-based analysis of (72) ⇔ shortest vector from LOC(CLOUD) 
⇔ the shortest vector to b from the cloud in cloud that is closest to b is diagonal w.r.t.
the 'above' direction This analysis of sentence (72) is true in Figure 4a but false in Figure 4b . Accordingly, it is useful for describing the behavior of such sentences in contexts like (73).
Test case 3: distal modifiers with projective locatives
As illustrated in (61c) above, projective locatives are often modified by distal predicates. Consider the following sentence, with a locative referential NP, in the situation of Figure  5a .
(75) The dot is 10cm below the line.
Sentence (75) is intuitively judged as true Figure 5a . As noted in section 3.4, similar situations support 'non-existential' interpretations of such sentences with projective locatives. Also sentence (75) cannot be paraphrased by stating that the dot is 10cm below some part (76) The dot is 10cm below a circle.
In Figure 5b , sentence (76) is intuitively true. Note that this is not simply an existential effect: sentence (76) is much less felicitous as describing Figure 5c , where another circle intervenes between the dot and the circle that is 10cm above it. Thus, this is another illustration for the non-existential interpretation of indefinites within projective PPs, discussed in section 3.4. However, unlike the projective constructions treated in section 3.4, we cannot use Z&W's shortest vector analysis for either sentence (76) or (75). Reconsider sentence (75). While this sentence is judged as true in Figure 5a , Z&W's analysis incorrectly treats it as false. This is because the shortest vector from the line to the dot in Figure 5a does not point downwards, and it is shorter than 10cm. We can solve this problem for Z&W's account by using the following analysis of sentence (75).
(77) The shortest vector to the dot that points downward from the line is 10cm long.
This statement is true in Figure 5a , as intuitively required for sentence (75). When analyzing sentence (76) we use same method, now employing the PEH analysis of the indefinite. We get the following analysis.
(78) The shortest vector to the dot that points downward from eigenspace of circles c 1 and c 2 is 10cm long.
This statement is true in Figure 5b , as intuitively required for sentence (76). Other cases of projective PPs modified by distal predicates show similar non-existential effects to sentence (76). Consider for instance the following examples from the internet.
(79) a. The VFR rules say that you must stay at least 500 feet below a cloud, more than 1000 feet above a cloud, and more than 2000 feet to the side of a cloud. (online network simulating real world flying and air traffic control) b. The pilot reported that he had been flying approximately 500 to 800 feet below a cloud layer that he estimated to be broken at 4,000 agl. (website on aviation accidents, agl=above ground level)
Similarly to sentence (76), also the sentences in (79a-b) have prominent non-existential interpretations: the indefinites do not refer to distances to an arbitrary cloud, but to distances to a cloud (or a cloud layer) that is closest to the located object. Therefore, (79a-b) are not accounted for by a simple existential analysis. Rather, they are treated by the same revision of Z&W's analysis that we used for sentence (76). More details on this necessary revision are deferred to future work.
Summary -the PEH and locative indefinites
In this section we have seen various non-existential effects with locative indefinites. Some of these effects are pseudo-universal, with the topological locative OUTSIDE and upwardmonotone distal locatives like FAR FROM. In many other cases, especially with non-monotone distal locatives, projective locatives and modified locatives, the non-existential effects with locative indefinites are more complex. However, as we have seen, whenever locative indefinites exhibit non-existential effects we find locative sentences with referential NPs that show similar effects with respect to the part-whole structure of entities. This observation supports our proposed generalization in (16) about locative indefinites. At the same time, it helps us to explain away their apparently recalcitrant quantificational behavior as a pseudo-quantificational effect, which follows directly from geometrical considerations and the treatment of indefinites as denoting properties under the Property-Eigenspace Hypothesis. The PEH does not stand in opposition to the traditional existential/specific account, which we still assume as one of the possible derivations with property-denoting indefinites. Importantly, the PEH does stand in opposition to any approach that would strive to account for all interpretations of locative indefinites as following from existential quantification over entities. In the next section we discuss one possible attempt to follow such a line, and show reasons to reject it.
What makes pure existential accounts undesirable?
An alternative to our property-based approach might be to assume that locative indefinites only denote existential quantifiers, but lead, by some means or other, to non-existential effects at the sentence level. In this section we briefly consider a possible version of this idea, suggested to us by an anonymous L&P reviewer. The reviewer proposes to analyze certain locatives as containing a covert negation operator that takes scope over an existential quantifier. After elaborating on this idea, we argue that it is conceptually inelegant and show that it is insufficient as a general theory of the phenomena described in section 3.
Introducing covert negation in locatives
The idea to add covert negation to the analysis of locatives is inspired by classic logical equivalences as in (80) below, where a negated existential behaves like a universal quantifier over a negated proposition.
(80) ¬∃x.P (x) ⇔ ∀x.¬P (x)
The equivalence in (80) is standardly used for explaining scopal interactions of indefinites with negation, as in sentence (81) below.
(81) John did not see a lion.
Sentence (81) has an existential/specific interpretation ('there's a lion that John didn't see') and a universal interpretation ('for each lion x, John didn't see x'). These two interpretations are traditionally analyzed as two different readings of sentence (81) under structural ambiguity. Consider the following simplified syntactic-semantic analysis of this ambiguity.
In analysis (82a) the existential quantifier takes scope over the negated verb. By contrast, in (82b), the object quantifier takes scope below negation, which leads to a universal effect at the sentential level, as intuitively required. An anonymous L&P reviewer suggests to use a similar line for treating locative indefinites as in our initial example (1a), which is reproduced below.
(83) Michael is far from a gas station.
Sentence (83) does not contain overt negation. However, suppose that the locative far from in (83) is considered synonymous with the expression not close to, and is decomposed at some level of the syntactic-semantic analysis into this negated form. With the necessary lexical and syntactic assumptions, sentence (83) might then be treated as scopally ambiguous similar to sentence (81). More concretely, using decomposition we may treat sentence (83) as having the following two analyses. In this analysis, the indefinite a gas station is treated as existential under both readings of the sentence, but one of the readings is universal due to the scope of the covert negation operator over the existential quantifier.
Arguments against the covert negation analysis of locatives
There are various reasons for rejecting the covert negation idea as a general account of locative indefinites. These reasons concern problems with non-universal interpretations, the massive decomposition required, unclear relations with other decompositional approaches, and the distribution of a/some contrasts.
Non-universal locative indefinites. Negating an existential quantifier results in universal quantification. However, some of the effects reviewed in section 3 are neither existential nor universal. Covert negation would not help in treating these examples. 13 Thus, a proponent of the idea that indefinites unambiguously denote existential quantifiers might try to capture contrasts as in (58a-b) by augmenting the system with some additional principles, e.g. a proximity principle that would give primacy to the circle in Figure 2 that is closer to the dot. Such a principle would stipulate one prediction of the PEH-based analysis and incorporate it into the semantic analysis of existential indefinites, without giving any support to the decompositional approach itself. Similar remarks hold with respect to the non-universal interpretations of non-monotone modified locatives presented in section 3.5.
The contrast between 'a' and 'some'. As we saw, some indefinites in PPs like far from some gas station only show existential/specific interpretations. The decompositional approach may block the universal analysis by using the common assumption that some is a positive-polarity item, i.e. an expression that cannot appear in the scope of negation (Szabolcsi 2004 , Giannakidou 2011 . This standard assumption would not help to analyze some indefinites in constructions like the dot is to the left of/10cm below some circle, where again, only the existential interpretation is available. Since such cases cannot be analyzed by covert negation, the decompositional approach would need a separate principle for explaining the difference between some and a when appearing with projective locatives like left of and right of.
Decomposition beyond 'far from'. As we saw in section 3.3, upward-monotone distal locatives like at least 20km from show the same (pseudo-)universal interpretations as far from. In the decompositional approach, this would mean that also these locatives should be analyzed as containing covert negation. For instance, the locative at least 20km from a church would have to be decomposed into not less than 20km from a church. Further, to capture the mixed existential/universal effects we saw with non-monotone distal locatives, we would need to decompose the locative exactly 20km from a church into at most 20km from a church and not less than 20km from a church. A theory that would try to adopt such decompositional stipulations for modified numerals would be unnecessarily complicated and inelegant.
Modification of decomposed locatives. Yet another complication for the decompositional approach is the treatment of modified locatives like 3m outside. To capture the pseudouniversal behavior of outside, as described in section 3.2, the decompositional approach would have to decompose it into not inside. However, the form 3m not inside is ungrammatical. To analyze such strings, the decompositional analysis would have to stipulate ad hoc semantic mechanisms only in order to analyze decomposed representations that the theory generates.
Selecting the decomposed item in antonymous pairs. Even in relation to the apparently successful decomposition of sentence (83) above there are some theoretical problems. While some works have assumed decomposition of adjectives, we are not aware of any independent motivation for the particular decomposition that the anonymous reviewer suggests for sentence (83). For instance, Büring (2007) proposes to decompose negative adjectives like short into little long. Heim (2008) argues against this proposal. However, even ignoring Heim's critique, we do not see how to reconcile the reviewer's suggestion with Büring's proposal. In the decompositional treatment that was suggested to us, the locative containing the positive adjective far is decomposed by using the adjective close. By contrast, in Büring's analysis the adjective close would be decomposed as little far, whereas the morpheme far would be left intact. Thus, as far as we can see, the decompositional analysis that the reviewer suggested for sentence (83) is inconsistent with Büring's proposal.
Summary. We have seen that the decompositional approach to locative indefinites must be limited to those cases that are interpreted universally. These are only a small subset of the non-existential effects that we have studied with locative indefinites. More complicated assumptions must be introduced to account for other non-existential effects. Furthermore, even with the upward-monotone distal locatives, which are interpreted universally, the decompositional approach would have to be quite cumbersome, and in conflict with other decompositional approaches to adjectives.
A note on NPIs. A conceivable argument in favor of the covert-negation approach is the distribution of negative polarity items, as illustrated by contrasts like far from (#close to) any car (Iatridou 2003 (Iatridou , 2007 . Such contrasts might be accounted for by the reviewer's proposal that far from, but not close to, involves a covert negative element. However, this would not constitute an advantage over the PEH. As we show in section 5, our proposal directly accounts for such contrasts with NPIs by relying on the same locative denotations we used above for far from and close to, which are distinguished in terms of their monotonicity properties. These properties are standardly used for explaining the distribution of NPIs without any postulation of covert negation.
Further issues
In this section we briefly remark on some broader implications of the semantics we have proposed for locative indefinites. We start out with two possible extensions of the framework for treating related problems with collective plural descriptions and with negative polarity items. Then we briefly remark on some open problems regarding property indefinites and part-whole structures, which are also of much relevance to the analysis of locative indefinites.
Treating locative plurals and locative NPIs

Locative collections and eigenspace convexity
Our treatment of pseudo-quantificational effects with locative indefinites has gained support from the similar behavior of entity-referring NPs. Our initial examples were the equivalences between far from London and 'far from every part of London', and between close to London and 'close to some part of London'. Part-whole structure is also manifested in the compositional semantics of NPs involving collective reference. Consider for instance the noun phrases the mountains and the mountain range in the following examples.
(85) a. The house is far from the mountains. b. The house is far from the mountain range.
(86) a. The house is close to the mountains. b. The house is close to the mountain range.
The sentences in (85) mean that the house is far from every mountain (in the mountain range). By contrast, in (86a-b), only one of the mountains has to be close to the house. Thus, like singular indefinites, also referential plurals (the mountains) and referential group terms (the mountain range) show the existential/universal variability we observe with 'simple' singular NPs like London, the city or Sierra Nevada. In all these cases, geometric features 10m Figure 6 : The house is 10m from the (row of) utility poles / #10m from a utility pole of the locative uniformly determine the pseudo-quantificational interpretation. We conclude that referential NPs, both singular and plural, are assigned eigenspaces that partake in a uniform way in the spatial interpretation of locative sentences. From the point of view of theories of plurality, this uniformity is hardly surprising: both referential plurals and singular group terms are often treated as entity-denoting, similar to referential singular NPs (Winter & Scha 2014) .
We might assume that the assignment of eigenspaces to entity-denoting NPs, both singular and plural, is identical to how eigenspaces are assigned to property-denoting indefinites. However, in one respect locative indefinites are different from locative referential NPs. According to the PEH, when a property P is assigned an eigenspace, this has to be the union of the eigenspaces of entities in P's extension. However, using a completely analogous analysis for locative referential NPs would not be fully accurate. Locative referential NPs have a tendency to show an 'atomic' behavior, which sets them apart from property-denoting indefinites. To see what we mean by that, consider for instance the following sentences in the context of Figure 6. (87) a. The house is (exactly) 10m away from the (row of) utility poles.
b. The house is (exactly) 10m away from a utility pole.
In Figure 6 , the pole that is closest to the house is more than 10m away from it. Despite this fact, the sentences in (87a) may be interpreted as true: we may think of the eigenspace of the description the (row of) utility poles as including the electric cable that the poles support, or even just an imaginary line between them. This geometric 'extension' procedure is not at work in sentence (87b), which must be interpreted as false in Figure 6 . Like J. Zwarts indefinites as in (87b). This contrast shows a clear difference between how eigenspaces are assigned to entities and to properties. We cannot further study this difference here, but we believe that finding more contrasts of this sort would help to understand better the use of eigenspaces in spatial semantics. 16
Anti-additivity and negative polarity items
We have seen two classes of locatives that give rise to pseudo-universal interpretations: upward-monotone distal locatives like far from and more than 10km from, and topological locatives like outside (of). These two classes of locatives show clear contrasts with downward-monotone distal locatives (close to, less than 10km from) and the topological locative inside, which give rise to pseudo-existential interpretations. The following equivalences reiterate these contrasts.
(88) a. Michael is far from London ⇔ Michael is far from every part of London. b. Michael is close to London ⇔ Michael is close to some part of London.
(89) a. Michael is outside London ⇔ Michael is outside every part of London. b. Michael is inside London ⇔ Michael is inside some part of London.
In formal terms, we have accounted for such contrasts using the following equivalences, where x is a point, A is a region, and A is a set of regions (cf. (24), (35a), (42a)).
In the linguistic literature, functions that support equivalences with universal statements as in (90a) and (91a) are known as anti-additive functions. Functions that support equivalences with existential statements like (90b) and (91b) are often called additive. In more precise terms, the equivalences in (90a)-(91b) illustrate (anti-)additivity on the second argument of the locative relations. A simple fact is that anti-additive functions are downward monotone, whereas additive functions are upward monotone. 17 Anti-additivity, and more generally downward-monotonicity, are often used when accounting for the distribution of negative polarity items (NPIs, see Fauconnier 1975 , Ladusaw 1979 , Nam 1994 , F. Zwarts 1998 , Giannakidou 2011 . For NPIs like any and ever, 16 For another relevant contrast between the two uses of eigenspaces, consider the sentence the circle is inside the rectangles, which can be true when the circle is contained in the union of the rectangles, but not in any single rectangle. By contrast, the circle is inside a rectangle is purely existential and cannot be true in such a situation. Our proposal here does not account for such contrasts, since the located object the circle is treated as a point, which cannot be contained in a finite union of rectangles unless it is contained in one of them. 17 Standardly, we say that a function f ∶ ℘ (90a) and (91a) shows that FAR FROM and OUTSIDE are downward monotone on their second argument; the '⇐' direction in (90b) (a Strawson-entailment) and (91b) shows that CLOSE TO and INSIDE are upward monotone on their second argument. Note that since distal locatives like less than 5km from are additive on their second argument, they are upward monotone. However, the distal predicate within the locative, i.e. less than 5km, is downward monotone. Therefore, somewhat counter-intuitively, we called such distal locatives 'DIST M↓ ' despite their upward-monotonicity. a commonly proposed grammaticality filter is that they should appear in the scope of an anti-additive function, or at least a downward-monotone function. With respect to distal locatives like far from and close to, Iatridou (2003 Iatridou ( , 2007 discusses contrasts like the following.
(92) Michael is far from (#close to) any gas station.
Also with outside and any, many examples like the following are easily found on the web. 18 (93) Bobby Finger is outside any political niche or anything anyone could call a mainstream media presence. The site is outside any identified good risk area on the Environment. I planted a 15x11 area to use as an orchard, it is outside of any forestry area. Svalbard is outside of any social security exchange contract.
By contrast, when searching strings like inside any, we most frequently found NPIs licensed by a non-locative downward-monotone function. For instance, in the clause if the test point is inside any of the hole boundaries, the NPI licenser is most likely the conditional. In many other cases of inside any, the item any is used as a free-choice item rather than an NPI, e.g. Melophobia is inside any Humbug pilgrim (for the NPI/FC distinction, see Giannakidou 2001) . Based on our treatment of locative indefinites, anti-additivity/downward-monotonicity of locatives accounts for the pattern observed with NPI licensing: far from/outside (of) any NPI vs. #close to/inside any NPI . More evidence for this treatment, here again with indefinites in the scope of the locative, come from the following entailments.
(94) a. Michael is far from a gas station ⇒ Michael is far from a big gas station. b. Michael is close to a gas station ⇒ Michael is close to a big gas station.
(95) a. The school is outside of a metropolitan county ⇒ The school is outside of a big metropolitan county. (cf. (20c)) b. This park is inside a metropolitan county ⇒ This park is inside a big metropolitan county.
We analyze the entailments of (94a) and (95a) as involving containment between the extensions of the properties big gas station/gas station and big metropolitan county/metropolitan county, hence also between their respective eigenspaces. With these containment relations, the entailments in (94a) and (95a) are expected because of the downward-monotonicity of far from and outside. By contrast, (94b) and (95b) involve upward-monotone locatives, and the entailments are properly blocked by our account. Note that a traditional, wide-scope existential, analysis of the indefinites in (94)-(95) would not account for these entailment 18 Lisa Matthewson suggests that in some cases there is a difference between outside any sentences like the dog is outside any doghouse and the dog is outside (of) a doghouse, where the latter involves a stronger domain restriction (e.g. the former is more easily acceptable in a context where there are no doghouses around). We believe that this question can only be treated within a theory of NPIs, where domain widening/restriction effects are taken into account. This goes beyond the scope of this paper. Another empirical question that Matthewson raises is whether there is a difference between outside (of) a and far from a in terms of their domain restrictions. We, like Matthewson, believe that the former are more restrictive, but we were not able to come up with decisive tests that would allow us to account for it. patterns. For instance, in (94), if there is a gas station x s.t. Michael is far from x, it does not follow that there is such a big gas station.
We conclude that both the distribution of NPIs and the entailment patterns with a indefinites support our characterization of anti-additivity with locatives, and more importantly for the purposes of this paper, the analysis of a indefinites as having narrow scope with respect to the locative expression. -denoting indefinites, the a/some distinction, and 
Loose ends
Property
indefinite subjects
As we have seen, locative indefinites with the article a get non-existential interpretations, which the PEH analyzes using their property denotation. Property-based accounts have also proven useful for analyzing other phenomena with indefinites. These phenomena include generic interpretations, predication constructions, there sentences, intensional transitive verbs, and incorporation phenomena. 19 Ideally, we should like to know if the current property-based semantics can be part of a unified theory in this large linguistic domain. While this general question goes beyond the scope of this work, we would like to point out one of its important aspects: the distinction between a indefinites and some indefinites. As we illustrated, some indefinites only show existential/specific interpretations in the locative constructions we studied. In this respect locative indefinites are similar to singular generic indefinites and predicative indefinites. Consider the following pairs of sentences. (98) Mary is looking for a/some maid.
(99) There is a/some dog in the kitchen.
In (96) the generic interpretation obtains with the a indefinite but not with the some indefinite. In (97) the a indefinite licenses the predication, whereas the some indefinite is ruled out or only licensed under a wide-scope/specific existential interpretation (Doron 1983 , Winter 2001 . In (98), the a indefinite can be interpreted as either de dicto or de re, whereas the some prefers, or even requires, the de re interpretation. By contrast, in (99), both the a and the some indefinites are licensed and lead to a similar interpretation. This means that the line suggested here is consistent with theories of the phenomena in (96)-(98), which let a indefinites denote properties, but avoid this denotation for some indefinites. However, theories like McNally's (1998) , which rely on property denotations of indefinites to also account for their behavior in there sentences, need to have a special account for the lack of the a/some contrast in cases like (99), visà vis the contrasts in (96)-(98). A related issue concerns property interpretations of locative indefinites in subject position. Consider the contrast between sentences (100) and (101) below in the given contexts. 20 (100) Context: Michael is driving in the Mojave Desert, moving away from the Las Vegas metropolitan area.
(However,) a gas station where Michael could rest and fuel up is still nearby.
(101) Context: Michael is driving in the Mojave Desert, moving towards the Las Vegas metropolitan area.
(However,) a gas station where Michael could rest and fuel up is still faraway.
In the given contexts there is a clear contrast between (100) and (101). Sentence (100) only has an existential/specific interpretation: one gas station near Michael is enough to make it true. By contrast, sentence (101) requires Michael to be far from all relevant gas stations. Thus, sentences (100) and (101), with a locative a indefinite in the subject position, show the same pseudo-quantificational contrast that we have observed all along in sentences where the locative indefinite is inside the PP. Note that there is no a priori reason to think that it is the context in (100) and (101) that favors the pseudo-existential or pseudo-universal interpretation. As far as the contexts go, the situation might have been the other way around.
The fact that the interpretations are as they are in (100) and (101) is further evidence for the PEH. However, interestingly, PEH-like effects with indefinite subjects as in (100)-(101) were much harder to find than the other pseudo-quantificational effects we studied using indefinites within locative PPs. For simple examples with indefinite subjects, e.g. a gas station is nearby/faraway, speaker judgements are less secure and it is harder to observe contrasts similar to the one between (100) and (101). Obviously, the modal ('could') and the temporal adverb ('still') make the judgements clearer in (100)-(101). This is unlike the situation with indefinite PPs, e.g. close to/far from a gas station, where no priming coming from modal or temporal expressions was required. We have no precise semantic proposal that would predict this difference between locative indefinites in subject position and locative indefinites within PPs. For further work on asymmetries between indefinite subjects and indefinite objects, see De Hoop & Kramer (2006) and Bianchi & Belletti (2014) .
Subpart monotonicity and part-whole structure
Part-whole relations and spatial relations have attracted much attention in the philosophical literature and in semantic theory (Cruse 1979 , Herskovits 1986 , Winston et al. 1987 , Iris et al. 1988 , Moltmann 1997 , Casati & Varzi 1999 , Johansson 2004 . Without getting into many of the relevant philosophical problems, this paper has concentrated on some linguistic puzzles about locatives and part-whole relations that seem to us of importance for semantic theories of indefinites and plurals. We started our study with subpart relations between descriptions of geographical units. As we saw, being in a locative relation to a complex entity like London has clear implications for locative relations to its subparts. For instance, being far from London entails being far from Islington, by virtue of the subpart relation between these two geographical entities. Further, we have also touched upon subpart relations between entities and collections. One example for this kind of subpart relations is the one between the entity for Mt. Whitney and the collection of entities denoted by descriptions like the mountains, the mountain range or Sierra Nevada. This kind of subpart relations also affects pseudo-quantificational interpretations with locatives. We proposed -and this is the essence of the PEH -that locative relations work similarly with indefinites like a city, which are treated as denoting a property with its own eigenspace. In this treatment, the entity for a specific city like London stands in a part-of relation to the denotation of the indefinite a city, in much the same way as Islington stands in a part-of relation to London. These different types of sub-part relations support spatial entailments like the following (Iris et al. 1988, p.435 ).
(102) Our friend is in Islington ⇒ Our friend is in London.
(103) The camp is on Mt. Whitney ⇒ The camp is in Sierra Nevada.
The camp is on Mt. Whitney ⇒ The camp is in the mountains (of Sierra Nevada). The camp is on Mt. Whitney ⇒ The camp is in the mountain range (of Sierra Nevada).
(104) Max is in London ⇒ Max is in a city.
The classification of the relation between London and a city as a 'subpart' relation is the most debatable. This is because entailments as in (104) are also expected by the traditional existential analysis of indefinites. However, while accepting the standard existential analysis as a viable option, we have seen that treating indefinites as property-denoting has linguistic advantages over their unitary treatment as quantifiers. This means that our PEHbased analysis of sentences like Max is in a city in (104) is on a par with more classical accounts of sub-part entailments as in (102) and (103). Considering all the relations mentioned above as instances of one general subpart relation, our accounts of all of these relations have consistently adopted the following assumption, which Casati & Varzi (1999, p.15 ) dub "obvious".
(105) If y is subpart of x, then LOC(y) ⊆ LOC(x).
In words: when y is a subpart of x, x's location must contain y. In our terms, this assumption reflects a monotonicity of the eigenspace function LOC with respect to the subpart order on objects (cf. Casati & Varzi 1999, p.54) . From this assumption we conclude the following: In our analysis of indefinites, we strengthened this subset relation into an equality whenever x is a property and Y is its extension. Thus, in the PEH we proposed that the location of a property equals the union of its extension's members locations. We leave it for further research to examine if a similar strengthening is also useful for subpart relations that do not involve property-denoting indefinites.
Conclusion
We have seen ample motivation for analyzing a indefinites as systematically ambiguous between properties and existential quantifiers. In locative PPs, this ambiguity allows us to capture the parallelism between the pseudo-quantificational behavior of a indefinites and the similar behavior of referential NPs with a part-whole structure. We saw advantages to the property-based approach over a possible attempt to decompose the meaning of locatives by using negation. Further, we saw support for our approach coming from the behavior of NPIs and collective descriptions within locative PPs. This gives substantial support for the property analysis of indefinites within a new empirical domain: the spatial semantics of prepositional phrases.
The results reported in this paper also have some more general implications. The proposal that speakers can express pseudo-quantificational statements by virtue of the meaning of locative relations is only one instance of a recurrent theme in semantic theory: the idea that lexical meanings of predicates may lead to pseudo-quantificational effects. This idea goes back to Milsark and Carlson's treatments of indefinites in the 1970s. Similar views were expressed in Kroch (1974) and Scha (1981) in relation to the semantics of plurals and distributivity. The link between pseudo-quantification and lexical knowledge is central for semantic theory, an area that is caught between questions about syntactic structure and problems of mental concept modeling. Further, existential quantifiers in our account are not just lexical denotations of certain indefinite items. Rather, we view existential quantification as part of derivational processes in natural languages, possibly in all of them. When an indefinite denotes a property, existential mechanisms may or may not be at work depending on the syntactic environment. Also this idea goes back at least to Milsark and Carlson's works, but it is also prominent in theories based on Partee's flexibility thesis, as well as in treatments of event variables, unselective binding of pronouns, choice functions, and other influential works in formal semantics over the last 40 years. We believe that the present study may help to further extend this line of work into a comprehensive theory of indefiniteness, spatial expressions and part-whole structure.
